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retired employee was compensation;, 6 the same result has been reached where the
payment is a lump sum. 7 Also somewhat troublesome are cases in which a technical
employment relation never existed between payor and recipient. In the case of tips,
the person making the payment is certainly not the employer; yet this is dearly compensation. Again where, as here, the services were rendered to the stockholders as A
corporation and the payment made by the same stockholders as B corporation, the
fact that the B corporation had never employed the recipients is hardly significant. 8
It is clear then that for these purposes, "employer" should mean no more than the
person to whom the services are rendered. Conceivably, even where the services are
not rendered to the payor, the payment might be regarded as compensation. For example, the payment by a son of the medical expenses of his mother would be compensation to the doctor, although a gift to the mother.x9
Even where the payment is completely incommensurate with the value of the
services rendered it should be treated as compensation for tax purposes. But calling it
compensation does not foreclose the possibility that the same payment might be regarded as an unjustified gift when there is a question not of taxation but of protecting
the rights of minority stockholders.20

Income Tax-Stock Dividends-Cost of Zero-Statute Drafted under Mistake[Federal].-A corporation having both common and preferred stock outstanding,
declared a dividend on its common stock payable in preferred. Later the corporation
purchased the dividend shares. The Board of Tax Appeals decided that there had not
been such redemption of the shares by the corporation as to constitute a dividend
taxable under section Ii5(g), but that the receipt of the dividend by the stockholder
was income. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the receipt of the dividend was
constitutionally income, but was exempt under section 1I5(f) which provided "a
stock dividend shall not be subject to tax";' and further that no part of the sale
proceeds could be taxed since, applying the rule used for the sale of gifts, the fair
market value of the stock at the date of receipt and the date of sale were the same. On
certiorarito the Supreme Court, held reversed. Although the receipt of the dividend
was not taxable because of the statutory exemption, the entire proceeds from the sale
were taxable since the cost of the dividend was zero. Helvering v. Gowran.
This case completes the pattern begun by Eimer v. Macomnber3 and left unfinished
by the Koshland case. 4 In holding a dividend of preferred on common, where both
are outstanding, within the Sixteenth Amendment the Court fulfilled the expectation
'65 Beatty v. Comm'r., 7 B.T.A. 726 (1927).
'7 Fisher v. Comm'r., 59 F. (2d) X92 (C.C.A. 2d 1932).
"8Bass v. Hawley, 62 F. (2d) 721 (C.C.A. 5th '933).
x9Consequently, even such payments as the Nobel Prize might seem to be payments for
services rendered to the public and their tax exemption attributed to the policy of encouraging
such services. C.C.H. Tax Service (1938) Vol. i, 1199.o5; cf. 1152.36.
2See Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (I933); Stevens, Handbook of the Law on Private
Corporations 217-22, 628-33 (1936).
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of most commentators.s The decision indicates that aity change in the stockholders'
interest as a result of a stock dividend will now be sufficient for the realization of
income since a dividend of preferred on common does not give rise to a new interest
totally separate from the stock on which the dividend was declared but actually tends
to dilute the value of the original stock by subordinating it to additional preferences
in dividends and on liquidation.6
Apart from its significance to the stock dividend question,7 the case presents an
interesting problem of construction. It seems quite dear that Congress drafted section
ii5(f) under a misapprehension as to the extent of Eisier v. Macomber.8 The intent
of Congress therefore, as is so frequent in cases of mistake,9 was two-fold: (i)to
exempt all stock dividends; (2) to exempt only that which was not constitutionally
income. Unless then the tax-payer was to escape tax altogether some sort of judicial
reformation of the statute was required. And given this initial situation, any construction of the statute must perforce be somewhat artificial.
The Court could perhaps have reached its result by finding section 1,5(f) ambiguous. On several occasions the Court has found some ambiguity here, distinguishing (i)
a dividend declared by a corporation in its own stock; (2) a dividend declared in the
stock of another corporation."° Hence, the provision is not, as the Court said it was,
"so clearly expressed as to leave no room for construction."'r Since "stock dividend"
is susceptible to the further ambiguity of meaning (i)stock dividends generally;
(2) stock dividends which are not constitutionally income, it could well have been
restricted to the latter meaning.
In employing the cost of zero approach, the Court seems at first to have created
future difficulties for the sake of the particular case. Since the cost of a dividend
cannot be said to vary with whether the government taxes it or not, a dividend taxable
5 Shulman, Undistributed Profits Tax Avoidance after the Koshland Case, 14 Tax Mag.
703, 704 (1936); Seligman, Implications and Effects of the Stock Dividend Decision, 21 Col.
L. Rev. 33, 331 (1921); Peper, Corporate Policy under the Surtax on Undistributed Profits,
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upon receipt must also have a zero cost. Consequently when such a dividend is sold,
the entire proceeds would again be susceptible to tax. And such a result would seem
to be a redueto ad absurdum of the construction.12 But it should be remembered that
such a case could not arise under the statute the Court was construing since under it
no stock dividend was taxable on receipt. Further, such a dilemma can be avoided
even under the present statute which taxes dividends on receipt by distinguishing
between cost and other bases for computing gain from sale. Within limits the government can add up a series of realized gains at whatever point it finds most convenient.
Thus, the gain arising from the purchase below market value is not taxed until
resale. 13 On the other hand, since the gain is taxed upon receipt, the value at the time
of receipt and not cost is the basis for computing gain from the sale of property acquired through giftX4 or death.' s Thus, although it would be impossible for a court in
future cases to vary the cost figure with the incidence of taxation, it would not be
impossible for it to interpolate into the statute a new basis for computing gains from
the sale of dividends taxable on receipt.
By not taxing the dividend until sale the Court delayed the tax. It is quite possible
that the statute of limitations 6 has run in similar cases since the receipt of dividends
but not since their sale, and because of the exemption in section II5(f) the government has not attempted to tax these dividends on receipt. Conceivably the Court
may have adopted the cost of zero approach to enable the government to tax the
transaction at the latest possible date and thus avoid the statute of limitations.
Labor Law-Anti-injunction Act-Picketing of Company-unionized Plant by
National Union-[Federal].-The plaintiff's employees, over 1,3oo in number, organized an independent labor union, found by the court to be neither company inspired
nor company dominated, and negotiated an agreement providing for wages, hours,
terms, and conditions of employment. Subsequently, the defendant union, an affiliate
of the C.I.O., began a unionization campaign to supplant the independent union as the
sole representative of all employees, though the employees were satisfied, none belonged to the defendant union, and they had expressed their opposition to that affiliation. In an effort to compel recognition by the plaintiff, the defendant had publicized
many false charges, had endeavored to intimidate the plaintiff's customers, and had
contemplated using physical violence. The plaintiff alleged that the conduct complained of was a conspiracy violative of the Federal Anti-Trust Acts,' and sought an
injunction restraining the alleged conspiracy. Held (one judge dissenting), temporary
injunction granted. The Norris-LaGuardia Act' is inapplicable, for the definition of a
12 It is not of course suggested that the government would actually attempt to tax twice
here. But see 51 Harv. L. Rev. 744, 745 (i938).
X3 Magill, Taxable Income 119, 120 (1936); see also Conm'r. v. Van Vorst, 59 F. (2d) 677,
(1932).
1445 Stat. 8M8 (1928), 26 U.S.C.A. § ii3a (2) (Supp. 1936).
zs§ 13a (5).
6 5 Stat. § 275 (1928), 26 U.S.C.A. § 275 (Supp. 1936).
'Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (x8go), 15 U.S.C.A. §§
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